The Duty of a Landowner Toward Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right: II by Bohlen, Francis H.
THE DUTY OF A LANDOWNER TOWARD THOSE ENTER-
ING HIS PREMISES OF THEIR OWN RIGHT. -
II
To determine what duty if any a landowner owes to a
fireman or police officer coming on his land in the performance
of his duty, it is necessary to examine the whole subject of
the obligations of owners to all those persons who come on
his premises, by their own wrong or of right, whether derived
from the owner's consent or independent of it.,
The decisions as to a landowner's liability to persons
injured on his property group themselves into two classes:
those in which the injuries are caused by the owner's acts
and those caused by the condition of his premises. In both
there is a gradual but persistent weakening of the original
concept that the owner was sovereign within his own bound-
aries and as such might do what he pleased on or with his
own domain. The King's law stopped at the boundary of
the owner's sovereign territory except in felonies and in
trespass actions, which were originally punitive and exten-
tions of the appeals for felonies to violent misdemeanors.
When the comparatively modern law of negligence reached
the relations of landowners to persons entering his property
it found the field occupied by this concept of the owner's
right as sovereign to do what he pleased on or with his own
property. The history of this subject is one of conflict
between the general principles of the law of negligence and
the traditional immunity of landowners.
The segregation of highway robbery from all other
forms of violent theft and the King's peculiar jurisdiction
over offences committed in the vicinity of his person, and
so within his personal peace, points to a time when his
authority stopped at the boundaries of the innumerable
local and feudal jurisdictions which covered England. But
the power of the crown to punish felonies even though com-
mitted within such jurisdictions is as ancient as our records.
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The writ of trespass was itself an exhibition of the grow-
ing power of the crown. It followed closely the general
features of the appeal of felony. By it the crown asserted
its power to punish those violent misconducts which threat-
ened the good order of the realm, but did not fall within
any of the felonies punishable by appeal. In its origin,
like the appeal of felony to which it was a supplement, it
was punitive and in that sense criminal, and it naturally
followed that the crown's jurisdiction in trespass like its
jurisdiction in felony extended to trespasses committed even
within the peculiar jurisdiction of the mightiest noble.
Therefore, the priyilege of a landowner to do what he pleased
on his own land, subject if he were lord of a manor only to
such redress as might be obtained from his own court, was
to this extent curtailed, and even his privilege to use force
in the defence of his privacy became subject to the scru-
tiny and control of the King's Justices. So when the writ
of trespass lost its early punitive and criminal, character,
and became a writ by which an individual aggrieved by
unlawful force could recover damages by way of compensa-
tion for the injury done him, a right of action in trespass
was consistently sustained where the landowner's action
was intended to -inflict injury or had that quality which in
criminal law is regarded as a legal equivalent, wanton or
wilful disregard of the injured person's safety.
Thus from the fact that the writ of trespass, while it
was in its essence criminal, included in its scope offences
committed by a landowner upon his own premises, appears
to have come the usual form of statement of a landowner's
liability for injuries inflicted upon his trespassers by his own
acts. In all but a few jurisdictions, the owner's liability
is stated in terms which require the existence of a substan-
tially criminal state of mind.2 The phraseology differs, but
2 So Knowlton, C. J., in Aiken v. Holyoke Street Ry., 184 Mass. 269
(1903). says of wanton and wilful wrongdoing, such "conduct is criminal or
quasi criminal. If it results in the death of the injured person, he "(the person
guilty of it) "is guilty of manslaughter." "That this constructive intention to
do an injury in such cases will be imputed in the absence of an actual intent to
harm a particular person, is recognized as an elementary principle in criminal
law. It is also recogifized in civil actions for recklessly and wantonly injuring
others by carelessness."
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in all require only that the landowner shall not inflict inten-
tional, wanton or wilful injury upon a trespasser.3
In some few jurisdictions, of which Massachusetts is
perhaps the most important and typical, these requirements
are from time to time stated as though they were universally
essential. And while the actual cases do not require the
court to define what constitutes that wilful or wanton wrong-
doing which will make a landowner liable to a trespasser,
the term is fully defined by it in other actions where a dis-
tinction is drawn between the extent of liability for such
misconduct and mere negligence. As so defined not only
must the act be intentional but there must be actual or
"constructive intention as to the consequences;" "A reckless
disregard of probable consequences" which makes the in-
tentional act, "otherwise mere negligence," "a wilful
wrong. "4
In both Massachusettss and New York an owner has
been liable to a trespasser "where," as Holmes, J. said in
8 "The owner of property is under a duty not to injure the trespasser
wilfully; 'not to do a wilful act in reckless disregard of ordinary.humanity to-
wards him, otherwise a man trespasses at his own risk,' "Hamilton, L. J., Latham
v. R. Johnson and Nephew, L. R. (1913) x K. B. 389, 411. In Nashville Ry. v.
Priest, 117 Ga. 767, (903) the owner is said only to be liable for conduct amount-
ing to "a reckless, wilful and wanton disregard of the trespasser's safety." In
Scheffer v. Sauer Co. 238 Pa. 550 (1913), it was said that the owner's only duty
toward a bare licensee, who, in this jurisdiction, is often said to stand in no
better position than a trespasser, "was to abstain from inflicting on him an in-
tentional wanton or wilful injury." In Hoberg v. Collins Lavery & Co., 8o
N. J. L. 425, (191o), Vorhees, J., said, p. 428 "as against a trespasser a mali-
cious or intentional injury is actionable while a merely negligent act will not
form the basis of recovery because the duty to observe reasonable care is not
owing to a trespasser' and p. 429: "That a defendant might reasonably have
anticipated a possible injury to a trespasser plays no part in determining wilful-
ness." See also Magar v. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387 (19o6); O'Brien v. Union
Freight R. R., 2o9 Mass. 449 (1911); Maynard v. N. & M. R. R., n5 Mass.
150 (874).
4 Aiken v. Holyoke, x84 Mass. 269 (19o3) per Knowlton, J., but see Bolin
v. Chicago etc. R. R., io8 Wis. 333, (9 oo) in which Marshall, J., says, p. 352,
"The danger of inflicting a personal injury upon a person by the conduct of
another must be such as to reasonably permit of the belief that such other either
contemplated producing it, or being conscious bf the danger that it would occur,
imposed that danger upon such person in utter disregard of the consequences;"
accord Hoberg v. Collins Lavory & Co., 8o N. J. L. 425 (1910). In these cases
the plaintiff was a boy injured by being thrown or driven from a car in which
he was trespassing.
6 Palmer v. Gordon, 173 Mass. 31o (z899). The plaintiff with some
other boys had disregarded the orders of the defendant (a restaurant keeper)
to leave his kitchen into which they had intruded. He drew a pan of scalding
water across the stove, in order to spill to on the stove and frighten the boys,
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the Massachusetts case, "although not specifically contem-
plating actual damage, (the owner) did an act specifically
contemplating the plaintiffs presence and directed against
him" and which "sufficiently and clearly threatens the dan-
ger which it brings to pass. " 7 While this statement indi-
cates that the act must be actuated by a purpose to affect
the trespasser, as in both cases by frightening him, and thus
evidencing at least a sort of hostility towards him, it is not
improbable that an act done .with knowledge of the tres-
passers presence under circumstances which clearly indicate
an obvious probability of injury to him would be held to
constitute wanton disregard for his safety, though not
directed against him or actuated by any purpose towards
him, but done for the purpose of furthering the owner's own
use of his land. 8 And even in Massachusetts there are inti-
and some of the water spilled on the plaintiff, scalding him. While Holmes, J.,
in one sentence of his opinion says, "that- he (the owner) may make himself
liable to a trespasser by an act that has reference to trespasser's presence, etc."
it seems clear that the phrase "has reference to" is not equivalent to "with
knowledge of" but requires that the act be done because of the presence of the
trespasser, either known to the owner or obviously expected by him, as in the"Spring gun" cases, Bird v. Holbrook, 4 Bingham 628 (1828); Hooker v. Miller,
37 Iowa, 613 (873); Grant v. Hass, 3! Tex. Civ. App. 688 (1903); State v. Barr,
ii Wash. 481 (1895); and see Scheurman v. Scharfenberg, 163 Ala. 337 (909)
where the peison injured was not merely a trespasser but a burglar, whom the
owner, had he been present, might have shot to protect his home.
Magar v. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387 (z9o6). The defendants were a
Mr. Hammond and his servant, Tompkins, employed to guard his fish pond,
who had shot thi plaintiff who was poaching. Tompkins denied that he had
fired at the plaintiff, asserting that he had fired into the air to frighten him.
Cullen, C. J. held that, "Neither Tompkins nor his master was liable for the
accidental discharge or merely negligent discharge of his rifle. If, on the other
hand, being aware that the plaintiff or other human beings, was on the bank of
the pond, Tompkins shot the-plaintiff wilfully, intending to hit him or some
human being, or if, without intending to hit the plaintiff or any human being, he
recklessly or wantonly shot where he had good reason to believe there were
human beings, then he is liable for the injury caused to the plaintiff."
7 But see Bolin v. R. R., io8 Wis. 333 (i9 oo) and Hoberg v. Collins, Lavery
& Co., 8o N. J. L. 425 (i91O) in which it is required that the injury must be so
obviously likely to occur that the deliberate act of creating the danger amounts
to wilfulness."
sAs in Walsh v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 221 Pa. 463 (1go8). The plain-
tiff, a girl of nine, was injured while in the company's premises. She was stand-
ing near to a cable which the company's engineer must have known was frayed.
The engineer passed close by her as she was so standing, entered the motor
house and started the motor setting the cable in motion. A frayed strand of
the cable caught the plaintiff's dress and dragged her into the drum. It was
held that "there was a duty not to injure her (a trespasser) intentionally or
wantonly by any act to expose her to danger" and that "whetherhe (the engineer)
actually saw her and was conscious that his act exposed her to danger" were
questions for the jury.
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mations that special care must be taken by those driving
railway engines to avoid running down even a trespasser
or bare licensee" if he is seen in helpless peril.10
But in the majority of jurisdiction, the court, while
still adhering to the traditional form of stating the owner's
liability, in practice permits recovery where the owner,
after discovering the presence of the trespassers, has failed
"to use proper care,""1 or "to use reasonable and proper
care to save and protect them (the trespassers) from the
probable consequence of their indiscretion or negligence."2
And the failure to exercise proper care, after discovery of
the trespasser's presence and his peril, is said to show the
reckless disregard for his safety and so to constitute wilful,
wanton wrong.13 Yet the standard of care required of an
owner observing the helpless peril of a trespasser is indis-
tinguishable from that required of any person carrying on
the same activities at a point where both he and the person
in peril have an equal right to be.
There have been but few cases in which a trespasser has
sought to recover for injuries inflicted by an owner in the
conduct of his ordinary private affairs upon his own prop-
erty." The usual case is one in which trespassers upon a
railway right of way have brought actions to recover dam-
ages for injuries caused by the failure of the engineer of the
As will be later seen in Massachusetts no distinction is made between
trespassers and bare licensees, and tolerated intruders.
10See Chenery v. Fitchburg R. R., 16o Mass. 211 (1893) and June v.
Boston and Albany R. R., 153 Mass. 79 (1891); in both cases the opinions
are by Holmes, J., who wrote the opinion in Palmer v. Gordon, supra note 5.
u Studley v. St. Paul & Duluth R. R., 48 Minn. 249 (1892)
2Anderson v. Chicago St. Paul etc. R. R., 87 Wis. i95 (1895), with which
compare Bolin v. R. R., io8 Wis. 333 (igio); note 4 supra. Accord: St. Louis,
etc. R. R., v. Townsend, 69 Ark. 38o (19ox); Gonza v. Texas Mexican R. R.,
41 S. W. 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897); Mathews v. Chicago etc. R. R., 63 Mo.
App. 569 (1895); B. & 0. R. R., v. Welch, 114 Md. 536, (i911).
3Sheedan v. St. Paul & Duluth R. R., 46 U.*S. App. 498 (C. C. A. 7th
circuit, 1896); Taimer v. Louisville & NashVille R. R., 6o Ala. 621 (1877);
Haley v. Kansas City etc. R. R., 113 Ala. 640 (i896); Martin v. Chicago etc.
R. R., 194 Ill. 138 (1902); Kronzer v. Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. R. R., I51 Ind.
587 (1898); Rosenthal v. N. Y. etc. R. R., 112, App. Div. 431 (N. Y. 19o6).
14 Palmer v. Gordon, supra note 5; Magar v. Hammond, supra note 6;
Walsh v. Pittsburgh Rys., supra note 8; Herrick v. Wixon, infra note 17; Rome
Furnace Co. v. Patterson, 12o Ga. 521 (19o4), infra note 18.
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train to stop it in time to avoid running him down. 15 In
such cases, the care which the engineer must exercise to avoid
the imputation of wanton and wilful misconduct after dis-
covering the helpless peril of the trespasser is substantially
the same as that which, to stand clear of mere negligence,
the motorman of a trolley car must exercise when he observes
a traveller in a similar peril upon that part of the highway
over which the traction company's line is laid. Yet in the
first case, the intruder upon the railway's right of way is as
much a trespasser as one who comes of his own motion into
a gentleman's country seat or into a manufacturing plant,
while in the second case, the traveller, as a member of the
public, has a right upon the highway inferior to that of the
company only in so far as the need of rapid transit may
require him to yield the right of way to the company's cars.
In both cases, the engineer or motorman having the right of
way (one because as owner the railroad is entitled to insist
upon intruders giving way to its use of its own land, the
other because of the necessity of rapid transit and because
the traction company's cars can travel only upon its tracks
requires other traffic to yield to them) may assume, until
there is proof to the contrary, that a mere waning to get
off the tracks will be effective in removing the trespasser or
traveller from the path of the engine or car. In each case,
therefore, he need not slacken speed nor take any partic-
ular precautioris to have his engine or car under peculiar
control until there is something to indicate that the intruder
or trespasser either does not hear the warning or is unable
to obey it. But once he observes facts which ought to in-
dicate to him that this is so, the engineer is as fully bound
15 See cases cited in notes i I, 12 and 13. It is curious to note that there
is no English case of this sort, see "The Fourth Dimension" by Rudyard Kip-
ling. In his dissenting opinion in Murphy v. Wabash R. R., 228 Mo. 56, (191o),
Woodson, J., pp. io8 et seg., presents some startling statistics showing the ap-
palling number of trespassers killed or injured every year upon railroads rights
of way and particularly the excessive frequency of such casualties in Missouri,
which he-suggests is due to what he regards as the undue consideration which
Missouri courts require railroads 1to show to such trespassers and to the so
called "humanitarian" extension of the "last clear chance" doctrine, in dealing
with the effect of a trespass considered as contributory negligence.
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as is the motorman to take every step necessary to avoid
running down the trespasser or traveller.
In some jurisdictions, the traditional form of statement
is completely abandoned; so in Buch v. Amory,I, Carpenter,
C. J., says of landowners duties to known trespassers: "They
are bound to abstain from any other and further intentional
or negligent acts of personal violence-bound to inflict on
him by means of their own active intervention no injury which
by due care they can avoid," and in Herrick v. Wixon, 17
Montgomery, J., says: "Every instinct of humanity revolts
from the suggestions that after the presence of the tres-
passer was known, the question of whether a dangerous
experiment shall be attempted in his presence or whether
an experiment shall only be conducted with due care for his
safety, can not be made to depend upon whether he has
forced himself into the owner's pi emises."i8
Passing to the owner's liability for injuries inflicted by
his acts upon a bare licensee, (i. e. one who comes, whether
at his own or the owner's suggestion, upon the premises for
his own purposes, the owner having no interest in his visit)
16 69 N. H. 257 (1897) p. 26o.
17 121 Mich. 384-(1899), P. 388; the plaintiff had crept under the flap of
the tent into the defendant's circus and was injured by a giant cracker set off
by a clown. On page 389 the court says on rehearing; "the plaintiff, together
with all others attending the performance, had the right to assume that the de-
fendant would exercise due care, proportioned to the consequences which would
be likely to arise from a failure in its exercise, to provide against dangerous
explosives."
18 In Rome Furnace Co. v. Patterson, 12o Ga. 521 (1904), it was held that,
if the defendant knew of the plaintiff's presence in his blacksmith shop, he would
be liable to him, though no facts "were alleged in the declaration from which
it could be inferred that he was even a licensee in the shop" for injuries due to
an explosion of dynamite, not intentionally caused but due to the folly of an
employee in blowing up the fire while the can of dynamite was standing on the
side of the forge. Fish, C. J., while reversing a judgment for the plaintiff on
demurrer on the ground that the declaration contained no sufficient allegation
that the defendant knew of the plaintiff's presence in his shop, held p. 523, that
"even as a trespasser, he (the plaintiff) would have a right to recover for any
injuries sustained by him in consequence of the defendant having negligently
and recklessly set in motion any destructive agency, the natural tendency of
which would be to imperil his life, if at the time of such negligent and reckless
act the defendant knew or ought to have known that he was likely to be injured
thereby." Here as in Herrick v. Wixon, the defendant was dealing with a
highly dangerous substance, but while in Herrick v. Wixon as in Walsh v. Pitts-
burgh Ry., supra note 8, the defendant intended to set the dangerous force in
motion, in Rome Furnace Co. v. Patterson the defendant clearly had no such
intention, his fault being unintentional negligence.
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the English Courts, which appear to have adhered rigidly
to the traditional liability of an owner towards a trespasser 19
hold that while a licensee takes the risk of the physical
condition of the premises yet he does not take the risk of
dangers superadded by the active misconduct of his host.20
No distinction is drawn between a bare licensee and a busi-
ness guest. Nor is it necessary that the owner shall know
of the licensee's presence to create a duty on his part to
refrain from acts likely to harm him. While he is not bound
to expect the presence of trespassers, though in fact there is
a real probability of their intrusion, he is bound to expect
that one to whom he has extended an invitation or permiss-
ion will accept it and will visit his premises. It is immaterial
what the purpose of the visit may be, whether for the sole
benefit of the visitor or partly at least for the benefit of the
owner. The important thing is that he has given his con-
sent and therefore must take. into account the probable
presence of either licensee or invitee upon those parts of
his property to which the invitation or permission applies.
In either case, he is liable if he or his employees do any act
which if they stopped to think they should realize would
imperil the safety of the licensee if he avails himself of the
permission granted him. It is extraordinary that a view
so logical as this should not have received universal accept-
ance. 21 It would seem that even the most ardent champion
1 See Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada v. Barrett, L. R., (i9II) A.C. 361
Council).
20 Gallagher v. Humphrey, 6 Law Times N. S. 684 (Q. B. 1862). "It
cannot be that, having granted permission to use a way subject to existing
dangers, he is to be allowed to do any further act to endanger the safety of the
person using the way," per Cockburn, C. J. See as to the liability of a Railway
to a person of gratuitously but expressly invited to ride in its engine, for injuries
caused by its careless operation, Harris v. Perry, L. R. (1903) 2 K. B. 219.
21 In the comparatively few cases where the plaintiff came on the premises
by the owner's actual permission the English rule is followed in some jurisdic-
tions. DeHaven v. Hennessy Co., 137 Fed. 472 (C. C. A. 6th Circuit 9o5);
Pomponio v. N. Y., N. H., R. R., 66 Conn. 528 (1895), where the Railroad had
indicated its willingness to permit the employees of a neighboring factory to
cross its tracks at a particular point by laying down planks, etc. And: it has
been applied in many jurisdictions to require Railroads to give signals of the
approach of their trains and otherwise to exercise care in the management of
their trains so as to avoid injuring persons at definite points where the public,
without interference but without actual permission and to the knowledge of the
railroad, are accustomed to cross. Barry v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 92 N. Y. 289
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of the owner's right to do what he pleases upon his own
property would concede that having chosen to admit others
within it, the owner had voluntarily yielded a part of his
privilege to do as he pleased thereon. Yet a number of
American jurisdictions make no distinction even in respect
to injuries caused by the active misconduct of owners be-
tween the merest of trespassers and those who come onto
the land at the owner's express invitation or permission, so
long as their visit is of no benefit to the owner.22
In all probability, this unfortunate attitude is due to
the high respect paid to the learning and ability of Chief
Justice Bigelow of Massachusetts, who, in his opinion in
(2883); Taylor v. R. R., 1I3 Pa. 262 (I886); West. & Atl. R. R. v. Meigs, 74
Ga. 857 (1885); Mitchell v. R. R., 68 N. H. 96 (1894); Green v. R. R., 1O
Mich. 648 (I896); Delaney v. R. R., 33 Wis. 67 (1873). There is much doubt
as to the propriety of placing such duty, as the courts may choose to lay upon the
Railroad under such circumstances, upon the ground that a "license" is to be
"implied" from its failure to prevent such habitual trespass; see post p. Butit would seem that those courts which take this view must recognize as high a
duty to the actually though gratuitously invited or permitted visitor, as to the
so called "licensee" by "implication" from the inaction of the owner.
22Although in 1868 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ex-
pressly followed Fallagher v. Humphrey .in the case of Corriganv. Union
Sugar Refinery, 98 Mass. 577, (x868), it has been repudiated in later decisions,
O'Brien v. Union Railroad, 209 Mass. 449 (9I1) in which it was said that
Corrigan v. Union Square Refinery "perhaps may stand on the ground of in-
tentional or reckless injurious acts." It was early held in New York that a
railroad must exercise care in running its trains over a permissive crossing,
Barry v. N. Y. Central R. R., 92 N. Y. 289 (1883); and in DeBoer v. Brooklyn
Wharf Co., 51 App. Div. 289 (N. Y. igoo), the same duty was laid upon an
owner operating a private railway. But in Weitzman v. Barber Asphalt Co.,
19o N. Y. 452 (igo8), Werner, J., said pp. 456-7, "As to such persons (tres-
passers and bare licensees) the well settled rule is that the only duty of the own
or occupants of the land is to abstain from inflicting intentional, wanton or
wi ful injuries." The actual facts of the case did not require this statement,
since the injury was caused by one of the ordinary operations of the defendant
business, the defendant's alleged default being his failure to warn the boys of
their danger. The case would seem to fall within the rule as stated by Wight-
man, J., in Gallagher v. Humphrey, supra, that "such a permission as i here
alleged may be subject to a qualification that the person giving it shall not be
liable for injuries to persons using the way arising from the ordinary state of
things of the ordinary nature of the business carried on." A licensee is not en-
titled to expect that any special preparation will be made for his reception or
that the owner will interrupt his business to tdke special precautions for his
safety. As Vann, J., said in Downes v. Elmira Bridge Co., 179 N. Y. 136, x42,
(1904), "where one enters a place where work is going on and he knows the nature
of the work and the condition of the place . . . . he takes the risk of the
operation of the workmen who cannot reasonably be required to give further
notice than the situation itself affords. Dangerous work in plain sight is notice
to a mere licensee," as indeed it is submitted it would be even to a person enter-
ing such a place on the owner's business.
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Sweeney v. The Old Colony Railway,23 divides the obliga-
tion of owners of land into two classes: toward those who
came thereon by his invitation and those who came by his
mere permission. His opinion made no distinction between
theowner's duty to put his premises in safe condition for the
visitor's use and his obligation to refrain from conduct
thereon of a sort likely to harm the visitor, if he came there.
The invited guest is entitled to protection in both respects.
The merely permitted guest is entitled to no greater protec-
tion in either respect than a trespasser. This classification
has yielded even in the jurisdiction in which it originated to
the influence of the English decisions, which make the in-
terest or lack of interest of the owner in the visit the crit-
erion of the extent of the obligation owed by him. But
unfortunately some courts still follow the subsidiary proposi-
tion laid down in Sweeney's case that an owner owes no duty
to refrain from conduct, no matter how probably injurious
it may be to licensees, which falls short of such wilful and
wanton wrongdoing as would make him liable to a tres-
passer. While the term "licensee" has thus taken on an
entirely new and different meaning, the owner's obligation
to the new class now identified by this term remains as
stated by Chief Justice Bigelow.
This whole question is, however, complicated by the
difficulty of drawing the line between active misconduct
and mere failure to prepare a place safe for the reception
of the visitor or licensee. As will be seen, there is univer-
sally recognized a vital difference between the duty of a
landowner to provide a safe place for the reception of these
two classes. In particular cases, it is often difficult to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff's injury is due to active miscon-
duct or to failure to put the premises in good condition.24
Many of the cases in which it is stated that an owner owes
no greater duty to a bare licensee than his traditional duty
2392 Mass. 368 (1895).
24 Compare Barry v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., supra note 21, with Nicholson v.
Erie R. R., 41 N. Y. 525 (I87O) and Sutton v. New York Central R. R., 66 N.
Y. 243 (1876).
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to trespassers, are cases in which the licensee is injured by a
condition caused by the owner's use of his property or by
the work which is done thereon. The condition, though
perhaps of recent origin, existed either when the permission
to enter was given or when the licensee entered under it.
These cases, it is submitted, are clearly cases where the
owner's fault, if any, lay in failing to provide a safe premises
for the reception of his guest. In other cases, and these are
admittedly more difficult, the licensee is injured by acts of
the owner or of his servants which are in themselves proper,
but which are dangerous and cause injury because the
appliances or machinery used are defective. Here also if
the defect was now known to' the owner, but could have
been discovered by a reasonable inspection, it seems clear
that the injury is due to an inadequate preparation, and
there being no duty on the part of the owner to inspect his
premises so as to put it in safe condition for a mere licensee,
there can be no liability even under the English view. But
where the owner knows that the appliance is defective, the
case is more difficult. In strictness, it would seem that
there is here not merely a failure to put the premises in good
condition, but active fault in doing an act which when and
as done is known to be dangerous because of the defective
character of the instrument with which it is done.25
And it must not be forgotten that one who accepts a
gratuitous gift of a right to use another's premises, must
realize that he must not only take them as he finds them,
but also, if they are in active use for the owner's business
purposes, that he cannot expect to find them free from such
dangers as are inherent in such use, and just as he has no
right to expect that the owner will go to any pains to prepare
the premises as a place for his use, so he has no right to ex-
pect that he will alter or change his normal system of work
for his protection.26 Therefore he can not expect "special
25 As in Walsh v. Pittsburgh Rys., supra, note 8.216 See Wightman, J., in Gallagher v. Humphrey, and Vann, J. in Downes
v. Elmira Bridge Co. supra note 22 and Holmes, J. in Metcalfe v. Cunard S. S.
Co., 147 Mass. 66. (i888), and see Rosenthal v. Beef Co., ioi N.Y.S. 532
(1906) and Habina v. Electric Co., 150 Mich. 41 (1907).
248 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
precautions" for his protection.27 It may therefore well be
that an owner is not bound to warn possible or even probable
visitors, though invited or expressly permitted, that he is
about to do some perfectly proper act whose only danger
lies in the possibility that the visitor will not be on the alert
to avoid it. It is the visitor's duty to be on the lookout for
such dangers as are incident to the owner's normal use of
his land, not the owner's duty to give him notice.
But the principal source of difficulty and confusion is a
failure to discriminate between a true though gratuitous
permission and a mere toleration of or a failure to prevent
or punish actually undesired or even highly distasteful
trespassers. In the majority of cases in which an owner's
duty to a "licensee" has been judicially discussed, the so
called "licensee" has been a mere tolerated trespasser. And
it may well be that a court may properly hesitate to accord
the same status to him as to one whom the owner has actually
chosen to admit to his premises. An actual permission is
generally given to some person or class for some particular
purpose, and so is definite end limited both as to area and
duration. The owner who has given it may well be taken
to have- voluntarily surrendered so much of his liberty of
use of this area during this time as is necessary to avoid
injuring his guests if they avail themselves of it. But it is
quite a different matter to impose a similar restriction upon
owners who do not exclude or punish undesired intruders.
Both the area of intrusion and the times when it may occur
are generally indefinite. The restriction on his freedom of
use would therefore be far more substantial, and it would
be a restriction not created by any act expressing his will to
suffer it, but imposed upon him by the wrongful acts of the
intruders and his mere failure to take active steps to prevent
them.
27 This seems to be in part at least the basis of those Massachusetts de-
cisions which deny the duty of railroads to take care in the operation of these
trains or to give warning of their approach when passing over or coming to
permissive crossings; see Cheney y. Fitchburg R. R. and June v. B. & A. R. R.,
note io supra.
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In some few cases the owner's inaction may actually
indicate a will to permit the entry, such is not usually
the case.2 8 The question, like that as to whether physical
changes in the property are such as warrant others in as-
suming that they are made in preparation for his visits, and
os justifying him in assuming them to be an invitation,
is one of the probative value of the owners conduct, whether
passive or active. And if there is any obvious explanation
other than that of an apparent will to permit or invite, the
inaction or preparation loses even its quality of prima facie
proof of such wilI.30 Failure to prosecute persons who in-
trude despite signs notifying them not to trespass, where such
persons are customers of the owner, whose trade would be
lost if he took legal proceedings against them, 3" failure to
go to the expense of putting up intruder-proof fences or of
stationing a corps of guards to patrol every available point
of entry, or to take any other steps to exclude trespassers,
which are obviously futile unless so done as to be ruinously
expensive, are neither prima facie proof of consent nor would
they justify the public in assuming a true acquiescence in its
intrusions. Those decisions and dicta which go even further
and regard them as equivalent to a true license or permission
eliminate the consent of the owner as a factor determinative
on his liabilities and duties.
As a general rule, mere failure to prevent the perpe-
tration of a wrong, or to object to it or to punish the wrong-
doer, can not give the wrongdoer the right to repeat the
offense, much less can it give the color of right to his subse-
quent misconduct. It may be that if an owner fails to object
"As in Pomponio v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., supra, note 21.
"As in Murphy v. Boston & Albany R. R., 133 Mass, 121 (1882), Central
R. R. v. Robertson, 95 Ga. 430 (1894), and Slaughter v. R. R., z67 Ind. 330
(19o6); and see Holmes, J. in Chenery v. Fitchburg R. R. 16o Mass. 211 (1893),
See also Holmes v. Drew, 151 Mass. 578 (i8go); Knowlton J. in Plummer v.
Dill, i56 Mass. 424 (1892) p. 430; and Stevens v. Nichols, 155 Mass. 472 (1892),
as to the duty of a landowner who has given to a portion of his property the
appearance of being part of the highway to assume the duty of maintaining it
inigood repair.
3" Furey v. R. R., 67 N. J. L. 270 (I9OI); Johnson v. R. R., 125 Mass.
75 (1878).
"As in Lowery v. Walker, L. R. (i91I) A. C. ii.
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to an habitual course of trespassing, he would be taken to
have forfeited his right to exact the penalty to which he
would otherwise be entitled. Such toleration might be a
defense to an action by the owner or to a criminal prosecu-
tion for trespass, on much the same principal that a failure
to require the observance of the letter of a continuing con-
tract may preclude the party so failing from treating a
later and similar departure from strict performance as a
breach. In each case, his toleration of the violation of his
strict rights may lull the other into a feeling of security, and
one thus sleeping on his legal rights may be estopped from
asserting them till he has given notice that his temper has
changed and that he will thereafter require them to be
strictly observed. But while he may thus forfeit his right
to treat the other's act as a wrong against him and from ex-
acting the prescribed penalty, this falls far short of creating
in the wrongdoer a right agairist himself.
It is noteworthy that no court has held that inaction
in the face of a probability of occasional trespasses at any
one of a number of points on an owner's premises or a fail-
ure to meet and eject a person who is known to intend to
intrude confers on the intruder a "license by acquiescence."
The so called licence implied from acquiescence arises only
where there are habitual and frequent intrusions by a num-
erous class upon a more or less strictly defined area. So
while many jurisdictions require railroads to anticipate the
presence of travellers upon mere permissive crossings3 2 or
upon tracks laid through a town on a highway,33 or upon a
beaten path along the tracks and within their right of way34.
and to exercise toward them a degree of care indistinguish-
able from that owed to persons passing over a level highway
crossing, no similar duty is recognized as due persons tres-
passing upon their right of way in general.35 And yet the.
prevelance of such trespasses is notorious.
32 See cases cited in note 21, supra.
3 Baltimore & Potomac R. R., v. Cumberland, 176 U. S. 232 (igoo), and
see Smedis v. R. R., 88 N. Y. 13 (1882); Lake Shire etc. R. R., v. Bodemer, I39-
Ill. 596 (1892); and Lafayette etc. R. R., v. Adams 26 Ind. 76 (1866).
34 Brown v. R. R., 73 N. H. 568 (19o6); Davis v. R. R., 58 Wis. 646 (1883).
35 Sheav R. R., 69 N. H. 361 (1898) p. 363; Kaseman v. Sunbury 197'
Pa. 162 (i9oo): semble Wabash R. R., v. Jones 163 Ill. 167 (1896).
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Many, if not the majority of jurisdictions hold that:
if there has been intrusion sufficiently habitual to make its
repetition not merely possible but probable,6 upon a definite
area, by a class sufficiently numerous to make the danger
substantial, the public interest in the preservation of its
most valuable asset, the life and limbs of its members, re-
quires the owner to forego his privilege to consider only the
safety of those to whom he throws open his land, and de-
mands that he shall refrain from doing, without notice, acts
outside of his ordinary and normal use of his land, which
create new and concealed dangers thereon. This duty may
be similar or identical in extent to that owed to persons
actually permitted to come on the premises for their own
purposes. But it does not arise from the owner's consent,
but from the probability of injury so likely and so serious
that public policy requires that it be prevented even at the
cost of trenching upon the traditional privileges of land-
owners.17
This may seem hypercriticism, but the popular Ameri-
can formula that the owner only owes duties to business
invitees or to licensees and none to persons coming of their
own right on his premises, much less to those who come by
their* own wrong can only be justified on the idea that the
owner owes no duty to anyone till he has them opened his
land to them. It is, therefore, important to recognize that
here is a class to whom protection is given, who come on land
without the owner's will, and this is so, even though in order
to secure apparent conformity between practice and tradition,
the courts choose to call that a license which lacks every ele-
ment of true consent, or to hold that a "license" is to be "im-
36 Probable on the particular occasion, certain to occur with reasonable
frequency from time to time.
37 In Lowery v. Walker, L. R. (1911) A. 'C. ii, Lord Lonebum L. C. said,
p 12, "The plaintiff was not proved to be in this field of 
right; .... he wastere as one of the public who habitually used the field to the knowledge of the
defendant,..the defendant did not take steps to prevent this user; and in
those circumstances it can not be lawful that the defendant should with impunity
allow a horse which he knew to be a savage and dangerous beast to be loose
in the field without giving any warning whatever, either to the plaintiff or to
the public, of the dangerous character of the animal."
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plied" from facts which do not even amount to prima facie
proof of an actual willingness to receive the so called "licen-
see." There is no English case squarelypresentingthe question
of an owner's duty to refrain from acts likely to injure per-
sons whom he knows to have come or whom he has reason
to expect to come on his land by some right or privilege of
their own, which in n6 way depends on the owner's consent
or license expressed by invitation or actual permission or
"implied" from acquiescence.
But as will be later seen, the primary distinction drawn
is between the owner's duty to those "lawfully" or of right
upon his premises and those wrongfully there. Invitation
and permission are important as showing the most usual
basis of a lawful entry, the owner's actual leave or license;
"acquiescence" as precluding the owner from treating the
tolerated intruder as a mere trespasser3-but the essential
thing is the lawful or unlawful character of the intruder's
presence. As in the majority of American jurisdictions,
the fireman or policeman is treated as if a "bare licensee"
it would at least follow that he should be given at least as
much protection as that barest of "bare licensees," the so
called "licensee by acquiescence."' 2
38 See opinion of Lord Halsbury in Lowery v. Walker., L.'R. (i9ii),A. C.
1 I; pp. 13 and 14. Lord Atkinson speaks p. 4, of the plaintiff as being "lawfully
in the place where the accident happened to him."
9See accord: Houston Belt etc., R. R. v. O'Leary, 136 S. W. 6oi, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1911), though it would seem difficult to sustain the court's view that
each explosion of fireworks was a new negligent act occurring while the plaintiff,
a fire marshall, was on the premises, though the explosions were not caused by
any deliberate or negligent act of the defendant done after his entry, but were
due to the same preceding negligence which caused the fire which the fire marshall
was called to put out and indeed were themselves part of the same fire.
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